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No. 20100648 
IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT 
RON THAYER and CATHIE THAYER, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
WASHINGTON COUNTY SCHOOL DISTRICT; CITY OF SAINT GEORGE; 
ROBERT GOULDING; MICHAEL EATON; STACY RICHAN; DAVID 
AMODT; JOHN and JANE DOES I-X; ABC CORPORATIONS I-X; and XYZ 
PARTNERSHIPS I-X, 
Defendants. 
WASHINGTON COUNTY SCHOOL DISTRICT'S REPLY BRIEF 
The Defendant Washington County School District (District) responds to 
Plaintiffs' brief on a certified question of law. 
Summary of the Argument 
Plaintiffs' brief is telling not for what it states, but for what it does not. 
Plaintiffs' brief ignores the language of Plaintiffs' complaint. The brief ignores 
the approval exception's plain language. And the brief overlooks this Court's 
prior, settled precedent respecting the exception's proper reach. But more 
importantly, Plaintiffs' brief ignores the question certified by this Court and seeks 
instead to answer a question of Plaintiffs' own design. 
The District previously detailed the several reasons to cloak its conduct 
with sovereign immunity. Plaintiffs' brief quiets none. This Court should 
accordingly find that Plaintiffs' negligence claims are barred by the approval 
exception to Utah's Immunity Act. 
Argument 
The Court's Order accepting the certified question is clear and 
unambiguous. That order plainly asks whether "the conduct of the school district 
officials and those acting on the school's behalf, constitute the issuance of a 
'permit, license, certificate, approval, order, or similar authorization,' under Utah 
Code Ann. § 63G-7-301(5)(c) such that the state actors are entitled to immunity 
from liability pursuant to the Utah Governmental Immunity Act?" The School 
District affirmatively answered that question. Plaintiffs fail to answer the question 
at all.1 
1
 But on page 6 of their brief, Plaintiffs set out an entirely different 
question than the one certified by this Court. And curiously, Plaintiffs have failed 
to answer even that question. 
2 
I. PLAINTIFFS IGNORE THE QUESTION CERTIFIED BY THIS 
COURT, BUT THAT QUESTION SHOULD BE ANSWERED 
AFFIRMATIVELY. 
Plaintiffs' opening brief is flawed. Plaintiffs have not told this Court why 
the District's conduct or that of its employees did not constitute an approval or 
similar authorization protected by the approval exception to Utah's Immunity Act. 
Instead, Plaintiffs have told this Court that the approval exception does not apply 
to alleged, operational conduct, and that operational decisions must be analyzed 
under the discretionary function exception. 
In answering a question posed by them and not this Court, Plaintiffs have 
necessarily ignored the language of their own complaint, the language of the 
approval exception, and this Court's prior decisions that have analyzed and 
broadly applied that exception. This Court should similarly ignore and not 
consider Plaintiffs' extraneous arguments. But the Court should grant the District 
immunity from Plaintiffs' negligence claims. 
A. Plaintiffs Ignore the Allegations Contained in Their Own 
Complaint. 
When considering a motion for judgment on the pleadings, the court accepts 
the factual allegations in the plaintiffs complaint as true, drawing all reasonable 
inferences in the plaintiffs favor. See Healthcare Servs. Grp.y Inc. v. Utah Dep't 
3 
of Health, 2002 UT 5, \ 3,40 P.3d 591. The District set out the relevant facts 
from Plaintiffs' complaint on pages 5 to 7 of its opening brief. And on pages 9 to 
10 of that brief, the District restated verbatim Plaintiffs' claim that their son's 
tragic death arose from a high school vice principal's decision to approve and 
authorize a parent to transport, possess, maintain, and discharge a handgun, 
shooting blanks, to enhance the sound effects during rehearsals and performances 
of a high school play. 
Plaintiffs recount that story on pages 10 to 11 of their initial brief. But that 
factual recitation is bereft of the words "approve," "authorize," or their 
derivatives. Plaintiffs cannot dodge their complaint by recasting an express 
approval as a simple act of giving "consent." See Plas' Opening Br., p. 10 
("Goulding and Richan consented to utilization of the handgun in the play . . . . " ) . 
But Plaintiffs' own allegations, when viewed in a light most favorable to them, 
make clear that Tucker Thayer's untimely death arose out of a District employee's 
decision to approve and authorize the use of a handgun, shooting blanks, on 
school property. Compare Plas' Opening Br., pp. 10-11 with doc. 2, Compl. ffl[ 
13,22-23,31-32,35-36,77-78, 105, 111, 115, 121, 127, 145, 152. Those facts 
support the District's sovereign immunity under the Immunity Act's plain 
4 
language. This Court should find Plaintiffs' negligence claims are barred under 
that Act's approval exception. 
B. Plaintiffs Ignore the Plain Language of the Immunity Act. 
Plaintiffs also ignore the plain language of Utah's Immunity Act. Pertinent 
here, that Act states: 
Immunity from suit of each governmental entity is not 
waived . . . if the injury arises out of, in connection with, 
or results from... (c) the issuance, denial, suspension, 
or revocation of, or by failure or refusal to issue, deny, 
suspend, or revoke any permit, license, certificate, 
approval, order, or similar authorization. 
Id. § 63G-7-301(5)(c) (emphasis added). Plaintiffs have failed to explain why that 
broad, unambiguous language does not bar their state law claims. See Francis v. 
State, 2010 UT 62, ^  15, 17, P.3d ; see also, Moss v. Pete Suazo Athletic 
Comm 'n, 2007 UT 99, fflf 13, 15, 175 P.3d 1042. 
The approval exception is not limited to only "regulatory functions" or to 
discretionary conduct that goes beyond "the ministerial actions of a government 
employee in [its] day-to-day operations." See Plas' Opening Br., pp. 15-16. 
Absent from the face of the approval exception are the terms "regulate" or 
"discretion." But present instead, are the terms "approval" and "similar 
authorization." .See Utah Code Ann. § 63G-7-301(5)(c). Plaintiffs' injury arose 
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out of and is causally connected to the Vice Principal Goulding's approval or 
similar authorization. Plaintiffs' attempt, here, to read new terms into or to "place 
a condition on the applicability of the [approval] exception without any textual 
justification" is improper. See Moss, 2007 UT 99, ^  13; Lovendahl v. Jordan Sch. 
DisL, 2002 UT 130, ffij 57-58, 63 P.3d 705 (Assoc. C.J., Durrant, writing for 
majority). 
The Utah Legislature has plainly spoken, and this Court has previously 
ruled that the Immunity Act bars all negligence claims arising out of any approval 
or similar authorization. See Moss, 2007 UT 99, % 15 (licensing exception's broad 
language applies equally to "approvals and similar authorizations"); see also 
Gillman v. Utah Dep 't of Fin, Inst, 782 P.2d 506, 511-12 (Utah 1989) (finding 
predecessor to section 63G-7-301(5)(c) "bars all negligence actions that arise out 
of any licensing decision") (emphasis added). Plaintiffs point to no case law to 
support their preferred, restrictive reading of the approval exception. 
C. Plaintiffs Ignore the Governing Law. 
Finally, Plaintiffs do not seriously acknowledge or analyze this Court's 
common law precedent under the approval exception. Plaintiffs essentially ignore 
that authority. Instead, Plaintiffs rely on inapposite law to support their contention 
6 
that the approval exception should not be interpreted broadly; that exception, they 
contend, mirrors and has been supplanted by a restrictive analysis associated with 
the discretionary function exception to the State's general waiver of immunity. 
Though Plaintiffs cite to Moss, they ignore the fact the Court rejected a 
narrow reading of the approval exception, and held instead that subsection -
301(5)(c) "is not restricted to those decisions that constitute licensing decisions 
per se[; r]ather, it extends to approvals and similar authorizations." Id., 2007 UT 
99, \13 (emphasis added); but see Plas' Opening Br., p. 21 ("[T]his [C]ourt found 
the commission was immune from suit under the licensing exception because its 
challenged decision was directly related to the licensing activity it was endowed 
by law to perform.") Plaintiffs also do not cite the Court's decision in Gillman v. 
Department of Financial Institutions, 782 P.2d 506 (Utah 1989). There, the Court 
considered at length Section 63-30-10(3) - the predecessor to Section 63G-7-
301(5)(c) - and consequently rejected Gillman's similar attempt to view a 
challenged licensing action through the lens of discretionary conduct. Id. at 509-
512.2 Finally, Plaintiffs overlook this Court's recent decision in Francis, where -
albeit in dicta - the Court rejected the need for formality in applying the approval 
2
 The District addresses the Plaintiffs' discretionary function contentions 
and the Court's decision in Gillman at Point II, below. 
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exception, but recognized the State's claim that when a plaintiff paid a required 
entrance fee, the federal government implicitly authorized the plaintiff to camp on 
federal land. Id., 2010 UT 62, \ 13. 
Instead, Plaintiffs rely chiefly on the Court's 2002 decision in Healthcare 
Services Group, Inc. v. Utah Department of Health, 2002 UT 5, 40 P.3d 59, and 
they claim that the Court's "reasoning" in that case "applies with equal force" 
here. See Plas' Opening Br., p. 17. But this Court did not analyze the approval 
exception's reach in that case. Instead, the Court merely rejected that exception. 
There, Healthcare Services Group (HSG) appealed a district court order 
barring, in part, HSG's conversion claim. Id., 2002 UT 5, f 1. That claim 
stemmed from HSG's contractual relationship with a long-term healthcare 
provider (the provider) who operated two nursing homes in the state of Utah. In 
1989, HSG and the provider entered into a contract whereby HSG agreed to 
provide laundry services to the nursing home facilities. Id. at \ 6. The provider 
failed to pay HSG as agreed, and in 1993, HSG perfected a security interest in the 
provider's accounts and receivables - including its state medicaid 
reimbursements. Id. Then in 1995 and 1996, the federal Health Care Financing 
Administration (HCFA) imposed civil fines and penalties against the provider for 
violations of federal law. Id. at \ 7. Thereafter, the State assumed management of 
8 
one of the nursing homes, id. at % 4, and at HCFA's request, the State began to 
withhold and pay the provider's medicaid reimbursements to HCFA to satisfy the 
provider's civil penalties. Id. at \ 7. 
HSG sued, claiming that its perfected security interest took priority over 
HCFA's civil penalties and that the State's actions constituted a tortious 
conversion. Id. at f 8. The district court dismissed that claim, finding it was 
alternatively barred by the discretionary function, licensing/approval, inspection, 
and negligent misrepresentation exceptions to the Utah Immunity Act. Id. at f 27. 
HSG appealed. This Court addressed each exception, in turn. See id. ffif 28-30. 
Pertinent here is the Court's out-of-hand rejection of the State's claim that it 
was shielded from liability because its conduct arose out of the State's 
"involvement in regulating and licensing" the provider. The Court stated 
[t]his claim has nothing to do with the 'issuance, denial, 
suspension or revocation of. . . any permit, license, 
certificate, approval or similar authorization.' Rather, 
the claim is based on a perfected security interest and 
seeks recovery of funds wrongfully paid to another 
party. 
Id. (citation omitted). 
The Court did not analyze the State's licensing claim. And the Court did 
not consider - converse to Plaintiffs' suggestion - whether the State's alleged 
9 
licensing actions were ministerial or discretionary.3 It did not have to. To resolve 
the State's licensing claim, the Court needed look only to whether the State's 
conduct was related to an underlying license or approval. It was not; and the 
Court so found. Id. This decision is inapposite and of no value to the Court or the 
parties here. 
Plaintiffs next point to McCormick v. Carroll, 600 S.E. 2d 576 (W. Va. 
2004), a case that is factually and legally distinct. There, the West Virginia 
Supreme Court stated that the rationale for that state's similar exception "relate[d] 
to immunity for a political subdivision for liability for injuries that are caused by 
the conduct of a private party who obtains a permit or license for that conduct 
from the political subdivision." Id. at 581. Utah law is not similarly constrained. 
Utah's courts have long found that the approval exception immunizes a 
government entity from its own, alleged negligence arising out of a permit, 
license, approval or similar authority. Here, Plaintiffs seek to hold the 
3
 That language pertained only to the Court's analysis under the 
discretionary function exception to the State's immunity waiver. See Id. at \ 28; 
see also Utah Code Ann. 63G-7-301(5)(a) (retaining the State's immunity for 
injuries arising out of "the exercise or performance, or the failure to exercise or 
perform, a discretionary function, whether or not the discretion is abused.") Here, 
the District raised and the federal court asked this Court to consider whether 
Plaintiffs' injury arose out of an approval or similar authorization. Plaintiffs' 
discretionary function analysis is non-responsive. See discussion, pp. 19-23, infra. 
10 
Washington County School District liable for the District's own conduct in 
approving the presence of the handgun that led to Tucker Thayer's death. The 
Carroll court's analysis is not germane. 
Plaintiffs also mistakenly rely on Watson v. Apache County, 189 P.3d 1085 
(Ariz. Ct. App. 2008). Plaintiffs correctly note the similarities between the 
Arizona approval statute and Section 63G-7-301(5)(c), but they disregard the 
fundamental differences in the way that Arizona courts construe that state's 
immunity act. 
In Arizona, "[sjtatutes granting immunity . . . are construed narrowly to give 
effect to the policy 'that public entities are liable for acts and omissions of 
employees in accordance with the statutes and common law of [the] state.'" 
Watson, 189 P.3d at 1089. But in Utah, this Court has consistently acknowledged 
the necessity of governmental immunity in protecting the delivery of government 
services. See Epting v. State, 546 P.2d 242, 243 (Utah 1976) (holding that in 
enacting Immunity Act, the legislature "recognized the necessity of immunity as 
essential to the protections of the State in rendering the many and ever increasing 
number of governmental services."). The Court, therefore, construes statutory 
wording strictly, see Hall v. Utah Dep't ofCorrs., 2001 UT 34, \ 14, 24 P.3d 968, 
972, and applies the Act's "protective sweep" broadly to preserve the immunity 
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expressed on the face of the act. See Taylor v. Ogden City Sch. Dist., 927 P.3d 
159, 162 (Utah 1996). But even despite those analytical differences and the fact 
that the Court denied immunity in Watson, the Arizona Court's reasoning is 
relevant here. 
In Watson, property owners sought to build a fence around two, adjacent 
lots that were bounded on one side by a private easement. Prior to constructing 
the fence, on behalf of both property owners, Mrs. Watson approached the county 
to investigate the procedure for filing an abandonment of easement. Id. at 1087. 
Mrs. Watson spoke with four County employees in three separate departments -
assessor, zoning, and county attorney, respectively. Id. Each confirmed Mrs. 
Watson's understanding that the easement was private and that the property 
owners could fence the lots so long as the fence contained a gate and that the gate 
was kept unlocked. Id. 
The property owners constructed the fence, but were soon contacted by a 
neighbor who threatened a lawsuit if the fence were not removed. Id. The 
property owners did not remove the fence and the neighbors sued. Id. The 
Watsons filed a third-party complaint against the County, alleging the employees 
to whom Mrs. Watson spoke made fraudulent misrepresentations and were 
therefore negligent. M a t 1188. The County moved for summary judgment, 
12 
arguing that because Mrs. Watson had sought advice about where to construct the 
fence, she had also sought the County's approval to build the fence. Id. A trial 
court granted the County's motion and the Watsons appealed. Id. at 1089. 
Construing the statute narrowly, the Arizona court observed that "approval" 
was one of several terms used in the statute,4 and that it involved "more official 
government action than is implicated by an employee's opinion in response to an 
individual's question." Id. But given its proper context, the court found, "the 
word 'approval' is that of an 'authorization,' and, in turn, 'authorization' has been 
defined as 'legal power or right; sanction,' while 'authorize' has been defined as 
'to give official approval or legal power to;' and '[t]o empower; to give a right or 
authority to act.'" Id. (internal citations omitted). The court concluded, that when 
the term approval was thus analyzed, "Mrs. Watson was not seeking the County's 
permission to build the fence - she did not need it - but only information that 
[Mrs. Watson] believed that the County employees could readily provide to her." 
Id. 
4
 That statute read "[ujnless a public employee acting within the scope of 
the public employee's employment intended to cause injury or was grossly 
negligent, neither a public entity nor a public employee [was] liable for . . . [t]he 
issuance of or failure to revoke or suspend any permit, license, certificate, 
approval, order, or similar authorization for which absolute immunity it not 
provided." A.R.S. f 12.820.02(A)(5). 
13 
Using that definition, the District's conduct is immune. Because here, the 
Safe School Policy precluded the presence or use of a gun on school property. 
Accordingly, when Mr. Eaton sought out SRO Richan, and SRO Richan in turn 
sought out Vice Principal Goulding, neither wanted an opinion. But Mr. Eaton 
needed permission and an approval as an exception to policy, to permit a parent to 
transport, maintain, and use a .38 caliber handgun, loaded with blanks, to enhance 
the sound effects during a high school play. Vice Principal Goulding gave that 
permission and Plaintiffs' tragic injuries arose out the same. This Court should 
therefore find that the District is immune. 
Finally, Plaintiffs claim that when the Utah Legislature enacted the approval 
exception, it intended that public employees be immune only for their policy-
making discretion in determining whether to issue a permit, license, approval, or 
similar authorization in the first instance. See Plas' Opening Br., p. 20. But 
Plaintiffs cite only 57 American Jurisprudence, Second Edition, Municipal, 
County, School, and State Tort Liability, Section 180 (Nov. 2010), to support that 
claim. Telling, is the fact that Plaintiffs point to no authority from this Court or 
the legislature to verify their broad, general statement of legislative intent. 
Moreover, the District has searched, but has found no expressions of the Utah 
Legislature's purpose for enacting approval immunity. But that section has been a 
14 
part of Utah's Immunity Act since its inception. See Utah Legislative Council, 
Report of the Governmental Immunity Committee (Dec. 1964). 
Converse to Plaintiffs, the District set out the relevant authority in their 
Opening Brief to this Court. That authority governs and bars Plaintiffs' several 
negligence claims. 
II. PLAINTIFFS' INJURY AROSE OUT OF THE DISTRICT'S 
IMMUNE DECISION TO AUTHORIZE AND APPROVE, AS AN 
EXCEPTION TO POLICY, THE USE OF A HANDGUN, SHOOTING 
BLANKS, DURING REHEARSALS AND PERFORMANCES OF A 
HIGH SCHOOL PLAY. 
When determining whether a challenged action is barred by an exception to 
the State's general waiver of immunity, this Court necessarily focuses "on the 
conduct or situation out of which the injury arose, not on the theory of liability 
crafted by the plaintiff or the type of negligence alleged." Ledfors v. Emery 
County Sch. Dist., 849 P.2d 1162, 1166 (Utah 1993). The Court regularly denies a 
plaintiffs claim when it has been recast to evade a statutory exception "by 
recharacterizing the supposed cause of the injury." Id. at 1166-67; see also Taylor 
v. Ogden City Sch. Dist., 927 P.2d 159, 164 (Utah 1996); see also Tiede v. State, 
915 P.2d 500, 502 (Utah 1996); Malcolm v. State, 878 P.2d 1144, 1146-47 (Utah 
1994). 
15 
Here, Plaintiffs attempt to fashion a theory of liability by claiming that their 
son's death arose not out of a protected approval, but from a ministerial decision 
and the District's alleged negligence in carrying out that decision; conduct 
Plaintiffs claim falls without the scope of the discretionary function exception. 
See Plas' Opening Br., pp. 26-28; Utah Code Ann. § 63G-7-301(5)(a). But the 
predominant issue before this Court is whether the District is immune from 
liability for Plaintiffs' injuries under the approval exception. See Utah Code 
section 63G-7-301(5)(c). Because Plaintiffs' injury arose out of a high school 
principal's approval of use of a handgun, shooting blanks, during rehearsals and 
performances of a school play, the approval exception bars Plaintiffs' negligence 
claims. 
A. Plaintiffs' Analysis Reads the Approval Exception Out of 
Utah's Immunity Act and Renders that Section 
Superfluous. 
When interpreting a statute, this Court gives effect to the purpose and 
intent of the legislature. Grappendorfv. Pleasant Grove City, 2007 UT 84, f^ 12, 
48 P.3d 949. The Court considers the meaning of each term and "avoid[s] 
interpretations that will render portions of a statute superfluous." Id. (internal 
quotation marks and citation omitted). Utah's Immunity Act is comprehensive in 
16 
scope. Read harmoniously, section 63G-7-301(4) waives the State's sovereign 
immunity for negligent acts, and sections 63G-7-301(5)(a) through 63G-7-
301(5)(u), restore that immunity for injuries arising out specific types of 
negligence, including injuries that arise out of approvals or similar authorizations. 
See Utah Code Ann. § 63G-7-301; see also Gllman, 782 P.2d at 508. 
Plaintiffs acknowledge this statutory scheme, but they argue that by 
broadly interpreting the approval exception, the Court will render meaningless the 
general waiver of immunity set out in Utah Code Ann. § 63G-7-301(4) and the 
specific waiver for dangerous or defective conditions set out in section 63G-7-
301(3). See Plas' Opening Br., p. 22-25. But the Court has confronted similar 
claims and found them wanting. See Hoyer v. State, 2009 UT 38, fflf 27-29, 212 
P.3d 547 ("[0]ur case law shows that [plaintiff] fear that the government will be 
immune from all acts of negligence - is unfounded.") Moreover, the cases cited by 
Plaintiffs on page 23 of their brief belie this concern. 
Finally, Plaintiffs' claim that the approval exception immunizes 
governmental entities only from claims arising out of discretionary approvals or 
licensing decisions, itself, violates a fundamental tenet of statutory construction. 
But Utah's courts are constrained from interpreting the Immunity Act in a way 
that will render the approval exception superfluous. See Grappendorf, 2007 UT 
17 
84, |^ 12. And those courts must, whenever possible, interpret the plain language 
of any statute to give effect to all of the statutory terms. Lyon v. Burton, 2000 UT 
19, Tf 17, 5 P.3d 616. On its face, the approval exception bars all negligence 
claims arising out of any approval or similar authorization. See Utah Code Ann. \ 
63G-7-301(5)(c) (emphasis added). That exception retains the District's immunity 
here. 
Certainly, this Court has, from time-to-time, criticized the Immunity Act, 
but the Court has also recognized that "the legislature has spoken with clarity on 
the question of immunity," and that the Court is accordingly "constrained by the 
plain language of the Act and [by] prior case law on this point." Ledfors, 849 P.2d 
at 1167; see In re S.H.,S65 P.2d 1363, 1365 and at 1366 (Hall, C.J., dissenting); 
Malcolm, 878 P.2d at 1147; Tiede, 915 P.2d at 504. It is thus not for Plaintiffs to 
tailor the State's waiver of immunity more narrowly or to find that a government 
entity's approvals are immune only to they extent they also constitute, 
discretionary acts. Plaintiffs' injuries arose out of a high school vice principal's 
decision to approve and authorize a parent to transport, maintain, and use a 
handgun, shooting blanks, at rehearsals and performances of a school play. This 
Court should therefore bar Plaintiffs' negligence claims. 
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B. The Discretionary Function Exception to Utah's Immunity Act is 
Inapposite to the Certified Question. 
This Court asked the parties to answer whether the District's conduct 
constituted the issuance of an approval or similar authorization, such that the state 
actors were immune from Plaintiffs' suit. Plaintiffs have not answered that 
question; instead at Point C of their brief, Plaintiffs have told this Court that 
because the District engaged only in operational conduct, the discretionary 
function exception bars the District's immunity. 
1. Stare decisis promotes the District's sovereign immunity. 
Plaintiffs cannot shield themselves from dismissal merely by arguing that 
Vice Principal Goulding's approval constituted unprotected operational (i.e., 
nondiscretionary) conduct. See Plas' Opening Br., pp. 26-28. But this Court 
previously considered and rejected a plaintiffs attempt to skirt approval immunity 
by arguing that an injury arose not from a protected license, but from the breach of 
a nondiscretionary duty. See Gillman, 782 P.2d 506, 508-511 (Utah 1989) 
(rejecting claim and broadly interpreting reach of approval exception); see also 
Moss, 2007 UT 99, % 15. "Those asking [the Court] to overturn prior precedent 
have a substantial burden of persuasion." See State v. Menzies, 889 P.2d 393, 398 
(Utah 1994). Plaintiffs have not met that substantial burden here. 
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2. This Court's prior decision in Gillman supports the wholesale 
rejection of Plaintiffs' claims here. 
In Gillman, Gillman, a bankruptcy trustee, brought an investors' lawsuit 
against the Utah Department of Financial Institutions (the Department), claiming 
that it failed to properly regulate two failed thrifts. Id. at 508. The trial court 
granted the Department's summary judgment motion under the discretionary 
function, licensing, and inspection exceptions to the Act's general waiver of 
immunity. Id. at 509. Gillman appealed, and like Plaintiffs, Gillman attempted to 
recast his arguments to avoid those exceptions. 
Gillman's arguments were twofold. First, he attempted to avoid the 
discretionary function exception by arguing that the investors' injury arose from 
the Department's breach of a nondiscretionary duty, or from the Department's 
negligent, nondiscretionary implementation of its discretionary licensing 
authority. Id. Gillman also attempted to skirt the approval/licensing exception, by 
arguing that the investors' injury arose not from a licencing decision, but from the 
Department's failure to ensure that the thrifts adhered to conditions that the 
Department placed on the operating licenses in the first instance. Id. The Court 
examined each argument, but found that because all of the investors' injuries arose 
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out of a licensing decision, the Department was immune. Id.5 That analysis 
remains binding today. 
The Court analyzed Gillman's first argument in two steps. First, the Court 
addressed Gillman's claim that the investors' losses arose from the Department's 
nondiscretionary duty to supervise the thrifts' credit operations. But the Court 
determined that because the only sanction that the Department could have 
imposed on the failed thrifts was "to suspend or revoke" their operating licenses, 
the investors' alleged injury resulted from "a failure to suspend or revoke" those 
licenses - an immune act. Id. at 510-511. 
The Court also considered, but rejected the second part of Gillman's 
discretionary function argument and claim that although the Department's 
decision to approve the thrifts' lending applications was discretionary, the 
ministerial acts necessary to implement that decision were not. Id. at 511.6 The 
5
 The Court stated 
An examination of Gillman's arguments in detail demonstrates that 
at their heart, all are futile attempts to obscure the fact that the claims 
asserted are for injuries arising out of licensing decisions allegedly 
made in a negligent fashion. As such, they are all immune from suit 
Id. at 509. 
6
 The Court aptly observed 
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Court easily disposed of that claim, stating: 
Again, it is section [the licensing exception], not section 
[the discretionary function exception], that is the 
relevant provision because the injury necessarily 'arises 
out of the licensing decision, and section [63G-7-
301(5)(c)] bars all negligence actions that arise out of 
any licensing decision. 
Id. (emphasis added). 
Finally, the Court considered Gillman's second, substantive claim and 
attempt to impose liability on the Department not for its licensing decisions, but 
for the Department's alleged, negligent failure to ensure the thrifts complied with 
conditions that the Department imposed on their licenses. Id. at 511-12.7 The 
Gillman thus seeks to bring his claims within the scope of this 
Court's decisions holding that section [63G-7-301(5)(a)] provides no 
protection from suit for injury caused by the negligent 
implementation of an immunized discretionary decision. 
Id. at 511 (citing Doe v. Arguelles, 716 P.2d 279 (Utah 1985); Little v. Utah State 
Div. of Family Servs., 667 P.2d 49 (Utah 1983). 
7
 The Court characterized that claim as follows: 
In an attempt to avoid [the licensing exception], Gillman argues that 
the injury in question actually flowed not from a licensing decision 
covered by [that section], but from the breach of a common law duty 
of care owed to the public. 
Id. 
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Court found no merit to that claim, and held: 
The Department preconditioned the approval of Thrift's 
application to operate, as it was empowered to do. The 
failure to comply with those preconditions could only 
mean that the approval would not be effective or that it 
would be subject to revocation. In either event, the 
injury resulting from a failure to ensure that the 
conditions had been complied with or to speedily detect 
noncompliance again 'arises out of a licensing decision 
as that is broadly defined in section [63G-7-301(5)(c)]. 
M a t 512. 
Gillman remains good law, and it forecloses Plaintiffs' attempt to recast the 
certified question. But close examination of Plaintiffs' arguments demonstrates 
their futility. Despite Plaintiffs' earnest attempt to blur the facts alleged by their 
own complaint, Plaintiffs' various negligence claims seek recovery for an injury 
that arose squarely from the District's approval, whether negligently made or 
implemented. Thus, Plaintiffs' discretionary function claims aside, the District is 
immune from Plaintiffs' suit. 
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Conclusion 
Utah's Immunity Act confers immunity on local school districts for injuries 
that arise out of, occur in connection with, or result from an approval or similar 
authorization. Plaintiffs concede that Tucker Thayer's tragic death arose out of 
Robert Goulding's decision, made as an exception to the District's Safe School 
Policy, to authorize and approve a parent to transport, possess, maintain, and use a 
handgun, shooting blanks, during rehearsals and performances of a high school 
play. That conduct gives rise to the District's immunity under the plain language 
of the approval exception to the Immunity Act. It also gives rise to the District's 
immunity under settled, Utah law. The Court should therefore find that the 
District remains immune from Plaintiffs' negligence suit and, consequently, affirm 
the question certified to it. 
RESPECTFULLY submitted this 30th day of March, 2011. 
^(a,tevmw5 
^BRIDG^T K. ROMANO 
Assistant Attorney General 
Attorney for Defendants 
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